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NOTABLE TRENDS IN THE EU BUDGET
Introduction
This article aims to provide an overview of the EU 
budget. The main topics here are the developments that 
have taken place over the years and the structure of 
expenditure for the immediate future, as laid down in 
the recent agreement on the “Financial Perspective” for 
2007-2013. There will be no attempt to evaluate vari-
ous suggestions made by politicians and academics for 
optimising the EU budget decision-making procedure, 
e.g. those put forward by the ECB (2005). In view of 
the complexity of the European budget rules, a detailed 
examination of more technical aspects is beyond the 
scope of the present article, so that only the fundamen-
tal principles will be explained.
The article is arranged as follows. The ﬁ  rst  section 
describes the speciﬁ  c characteristics of the EU budget and 
the expenditure and revenue structure. The second sec-
tion goes into more detail on the two largest expenditure 
items, namely the common agricultural policy and the 
cohesion policy. The third section discusses the “Financial 
Perspective” for 2007-2013.
1.   EU budget : characteristics and 
developments
1.1 Characteristics
Although the EU budget has many characteristics in 
common with the budgets of the Member States or those 
of other countries, it also has a number of speciﬁ  c fea-
tures which are not found in national budgets.
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1.1.1  A balanced budget
In principle, the EU budget can never be in deﬁ  cit. The EU 
is not authorised to borrow, and its spending therefore 
cannot exceed its income. There are only a few excep-
tions to that rule, permitting limited borrowing, e.g. for 
the purpose of providing macro-ﬁ  nancial support to non- 
Member States.
1.1.2   The European Parliament does not have exclusive 
power
In the Member States, as in most other countries, the 
Parliament has full power to determine the budget rev-
enue and expenditure, but in the EU this is not the case, 
as the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament, 
which constitute the EU budget authority, share that 
power. The allocation of powers between the Council and 
the Parliament depends on the nature of the expenditure. 
A distinction is made between compulsory and non-
compulsory expenditure, each making up about half of 
the budget. The ﬁ  rst category comprises the expenditure 
resulting from the EU treaties, such as the bulk of the 
expenditure under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
or that relating to aid to developing countries. The non-
compulsory expenditure consists primarily of expenditure 
relating to the cohesion policy and the operation of the 
administration.  (1) The Council takes the ﬁ  nal decision on 
compulsory expenditure while the Parliament has the last 




(1)  The expression “non-compulsory expenditure” is somewhat misleading : under 
the labour laws, the payment of ofﬁ  cials’ salaries is, to be sure, “compulsory”, 
while the structural fund expenditure forms an essential part of EU policy. Yet 
both items are regarded as “non-compulsory” expenditure because they are not 
mentioned in themselves in the EU treaties.50
The annual procedure for drawing up and approving the 
budget is as follows :
–   the European Commission (EC) draws up a preliminary 
draft budget which it submits to the Council ;
–   the Council examines the proposal at its ﬁ  rst reading 
and may amend the preliminary draft by a qualiﬁ  ed 
majority. Following approval by the Council, it acquires 
the status of a draft budget ;
–   the European Parliament may then, in a ﬁ  rst reading, 
propose amendments to the compulsory and non-com-
pulsory expenditure ;
–   after that, the draft budget goes back to the Council 
which, in the second reading, takes a ﬁ  nal  decision 
on the compulsory expenditure. The Council may, by 
a qualiﬁ   ed majority, accept proposed changes put 
forward by the European Parliament and entailing an 
increase in the compulsory expenditure. Amendments 
not giving rise to any increase in that expenditure 
may be rejected by the Council by a qualiﬁ  ed majority. 
The Council may also reject by a qualiﬁ  ed majority the 
proposed amendments put forward by the European 
Parliament regarding the non-compulsory expendi-
ture. However, the European Parliament may resubmit 
these last amendments when voting on the budget 
as a whole, and thus has the ﬁ   nal say on the non-
  compulsory expenditure ;
–   the European Parliament has power, in the last instance, 
to adopt or reject the budget as a whole.
1.1.3  A binding multi-annual ﬁ  nancial framework
The EU expenditure is deﬁ   ned for a period of several 
years by the “Financial Perspective”, which lays down 
the maximum annual expenditure per heading. This fos-
ters budgetary discipline and makes it easier to predict 
expenditure in the medium term. Prior to the introduc-
tion of this multi-annual ﬁ  nancial framework, the annual 
budget negotiations in the late 1970s and in the 1980s 
increasingly led to sharp confrontations between the 
Parliament and the Council, which in 1979 and 1984 
actually led to the rejection of the whole budget by the 
European Parliament. The ﬁ   rst direct elections in 1979 
gave the European Parliament greater legitimacy, starting 
the trial of strength with the Council. In that context, the 
Financial Perspective provided stability by curtailing free-
dom of choice during the annual procedure. However, the 
Financial Perspective cannot be regarded as a fully-ﬂ  edged 
multi-annual budget, since the annual budget round is 
still necessary to set the actual amount of the expenditure 
and to allocate the maximum amounts per heading in 
detail among the various budget items.
The Financial Perspective is put into formal terms by an 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the three main 
European players, namely the European Parliament, the 
Council and the EC, and is an essential part of that agree-
ment. The ﬁ  rst Financial Perspective was incorporated in 
the “Delors I package” and related to a period of ﬁ  ve years 
(1988-1992). All the subsequent Financial Perspectives 
covered a period of seven years (1993-1999 for the 
“Delors II package” and 2000-2006 for the “Agenda 
2000”). In December 2005, the European Council reached 
a political agreement on the new Financial Perspective, i.e. 
for 2007-2013. On the basis of that agreement and fol-
lowing consultation between the EC, the Council and the 
European Parliament, a new Interinstitutional Agreement 
on the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 was approved in 
May 2006 by the Council and the European Parliament, 
on proposal of the Commission. It will enter into force on 
1 January 2007.
1.1.4  The EU does not have any actual revenue of its own
The EU cannot levy any taxes of its own, but is ﬁ  nanced 
almost entirely by transfers from the Member States. 
True, since the 1970 budget reform, the Union has had 
so-called “own resources” as a source of ﬁ  nance. These 
are speciﬁ   c revenue categories to which the Union is 
entitled without any further decision by the national 
authorities, once they have been deﬁ   ned by a Council 
“decision on own resources” and ratiﬁ  ed by the national 
parliaments of the Member States. However, the expres-
sion “own resources” is misleading, since the revenue is 
still collected by the Member States and then transferred 
to the EU. So in the end, these resources still consist of 
transfers from the Member States.
Since the 1970 budget reform, the method of ﬁ  nancing 
the EU has been adjusted on several occasions ; the latest 
decision on own resources was passed in September 
2000. Via the December 2005 political agreement on the 
Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the European Council 
sought a new decision on own resources. This new deci-
sion is to take effect at the beginning of 2009 at the 
latest, applying retroactively to 1 January 2007.
Belgium has often advocated the introduction of a genuine
European tax, e.g. an energy consumption tax, or the 
assignment to the EU of part of the revenue generated 
by corporation tax or taxes on savings income, the pri-
mary argument being that this would strengthen the link 
between the EU and its citizens while also obviating the 
need for the debate on the “budget balances” (to ﬁ  nd 
out which Member States are net contributors and which 
are net beneﬁ  ciaries, cf. below). However, a number of 
Member States are opposed to this proposal.51
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1.2 Principal  developments
1.2.1 Volume
The latest decision on own resources, passed in September 
2000, set a ceiling on the own resources of 1.24 p.c. of 
the EU’s gross national income (GNI), a percentage which 
is to be maintained according to the European Council 
agreement of December 2005. In accordance with the 
principle of balance, this percentage also represents 
an absolute ceiling for the expenditure. However, the 
commitment appropriations laid down by the Financial 
Perspectives in recent years have been considerably lower, 
at between 1.07 and 1.11 p.c. of GNI, in order to leave 
scope for unforeseen expenditure or in case economic 
growth should fall short of expectations. The volume of 
payment appropriations in the annual budgets has even 
hovered around 1 p.c. of GNI, whereas the payments actu-
ally made have even still been lower, partly because of the 
non-execution of certain projects, particularly under the 
cohesion policy. In comparison with the relative volume 
of public expenditure of the Member States – averaging 
around 47 p.c. of GNI – the EU budget is therefore decid-
edly modest. In absolute terms, the Community budget 
– which comes to around 110 billion euro in 2006 – is 
also barely more than the general government budget of 
Poland, and is actually less than that of small countries 
such as Austria and Belgium. This ﬁ  nding reﬂ  ects the allo-
cation of powers between the EU and the Member States. 
Over the years the total EU expenditure has nonetheless 
increased, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
cumulative expenditure of all governments in the Union.
1.2.2 Revenue
Apart from the relatively small and volatile amounts of 
“other revenues” (such as donations or taxes on the 
incomes of EU ofﬁ  cials) and “amounts carried over from 
the previous year”, the EU is ﬁ  nanced by what are called 
the “own resources”, which comprise the following major 
categories.
1.2.2.1  “Traditional” own resources
The traditional own resources consist mainly of agricultural 
duties and customs duties. These funds are collected by 
the Member States, which are allowed to keep 25 p.c. of 
the revenue to cover the collection costs ; these resources 
are collected at the external borders of the Union and are 
based on tariffs laid down by the EU under its trade policy 
and the CAP. These traditional own resources are insepa-
rable from the EU Treaty and can therefore be regarded as 
a kind of “natural” source of revenue.
Historically, these resources have been very considerable, 
but their volume has now declined sharply, dropping from 
almost half of the EU’s revenue in 1980 to around 13 p.c. 
for the years 2005-2006. This is not due to any reduction 
in the basis of assessment, since progressive globalisation 
has led to a sharp rise in imports, but is caused solely 
by the systematic reduction in the tariffs applied, in the 
context of the liberalisation of world trade. This last factor 
is also one of the driving forces behind the gradual align-
ment of EU agricultural product prices with world prices. 
According to World Bank estimates, the (unweighted) 
average EU import levy declined from 8.7 p.c. in 1988 to 
4.4 p.c. in 2003.
1.2.2.2 VAT-based  resources
This source consists of a percentage levied on the VAT 
base of the Member States. The same percentage is 
levied on a harmonised VAT base for all Member States. 
Harmonisation of the tax basis proved necessary because 
the goods and services covered by the VAT regulations 
may vary from one country to another. In principle, such a 
system is regressive in character, because consumption in 
proportion to GNI, and hence the harmonised VAT base, 
declines as the level of prosperity rises. Consequently, 






































































CHART 1  DEVELOPMENT AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE 
OF EU EXPENDITURE (1)
Source : EC.
(1)  Payment angle, including expenditure by the European Development Fund.
(right-hand 
scale)
Total EU expenditure (in billions of euro at 2004 prices) 
(left-hand scale)
Idem as p.c. of the public 
expenditure of the Member States
Idem as p.c. of the GNI of the EU  52
their GNI than the richer Member States. To counteract 
this perverse effect, the VAT base is limited to 50 p.c. of 
the GNI of each Member State. The maximum percen-
tage for the VAT contribution on this harmonised basis 
is currently set at 0.50 p.c., but owing to a number of 
technical adjustments the real percentage applied is now 
only 0.30 p.c. As a proportion of the own resources, 
VAT-based EU revenues have declined from more than 
half in the early 1980s to 14 p.c. in recent years, as a 
result of the gradual reduction in the maximum transfer 
percentage. This fall was due to the efforts to make the 
contributions less regressive, and was therefore intended 
to help the poorer Member States.
1.2.2.3  GNI-based resources (“fourth resource”)
Since, in principle, the EU budget must always balance, a 
balancing item is required on the revenue side. In 1988, 
the “fourth resource” was introduced for that purpose, 
replacing the VAT source in that role. The object of this 
was to reduce the regressive nature of the contributions. 
The “fourth resource” consists of a contribution which 
the Member States have to pay in proportion to their 
share in the total GNI of the EU. The percentage of GNI 
payable is calculated annually such that no ﬁ  nancing 
deﬁ  cit is recorded. For example, it is estimated that, in 
2006, the contribution will come to around 0.7 p.c. 
of GNI. The share of the “fourth resource” in the total 
resources of the EU has increased sharply since 1988, 
amounting to over 70 p.c. of total revenue in 2006. 
Some people are calling for EU expenditure to be funded 
entirely on the basis of GNI, because the current allocation 
per Member State – taking account of the adjustments to 
the VAT base – is in fact little different from an allocation 
based exclusively on GNI, and it would be simpler.
1.2.3   The “British rebate” and the contributions per 
Member State
At the Fontainebleau Summit in 1984, the British Prime 
Minister of the day, Margaret Thatcher, had demanded 
a correction to the United Kingdom’s contribution 
(“I want my money back  !”), the main argument being 
that her country was paying too much in relation to its 
level of welfare and that a disproportionate part of the 
Community expenditure was devoted to the CAP, from 
which the British received little.
This adjustment (also known as the “British rebate”) 
was introduced in 1985. The rebate is complicated to 
calculate, and there have been a number of changes 
since its introduction. For 2006 this rebate came to 
roughly 30 p.c.  : without this adjustment, the United 
Kingdom would have had to contribute 19.4 billion 
euro, as opposed to the current ﬁ   gure of 13.7 billion. 
This reduction in the United Kingdom’s contribution is 
charged to the other 24 Member States in proportion to 
their share in the total GNI of the EU. However, in the 
case of Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden, 
the contribution towards ﬁ  nancing the “British rebate” 
is limited to one quarter of their theoretical contribu-
tion. The remaining three quarters are paid by the other 
20 Member States.
At the time of the negotiation of the Financial Perspective 
2007-2013, the British rebate was the subject of lively 
debate : the Commission and the other Member States 
wished to abolish this arrangement and replace it with 
a general correction mechanism, especially as the argu-
ments put forward at the time are no longer valid. The 
United Kingdom is now one of the most prosperous EU 
Member States, as a result of strong economic expan-
sion in the past few decades and the enlargement of the 
EU to include Central and Eastern Europe, entailing the 
accession of ten relatively poor Member States  ; more-
over, spending on agriculture has become relatively less 
important. As a result of a hard-fought compromise, it 
was decided that the United Kingdom would keep its 















































































CHART 2  STRUCTURE OF THE EU’S REVENUE
  (Percentages of the total)
Source : EC.
(1)  Excluding the compensation which Member States receive for collecting the 
agricultural duties and customs duties.
Fourth source
Other revenue plus amounts carried over 
from the previous year
Agricultural duties (including sugar levies) (1)
Import duties (1)
VAT53
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more towards the costs of the EU enlargement, up to a 
maximum of 10.5 billion euro over the entire period of 
the Financial Perspective.
The contribution of the Member States to the EU’s own 
resources, expressed in relation to their GNI, averages 
1.03 p.c. but Belgium and the Netherlands pay a larger 
contribution. These two countries collect indeed a rela-
tively large amount of customs duties and agricultural 
duties, since a substantial proportion of Community 
imports enters the EU through their ports. The United 
Kingdom’s contribution towards the EU budget is lower 
in relation to its GNI, on account of the special British 
rebate.
France and Italy bear the major part of the cost of that 
British rebate, in contrast to Germany, which receives a 
reduction on the rebate. Thus, the German contribution 
to the ﬁ  nancing of the British rebate in 2006 was just 
0.35 billion euro, only slightly more than the approxi-
mately 0.28 billion euro paid by Belgium. For the same 
reason, the Dutch share is smaller than Belgium’s, at 
0.075 billion euro. The ten new Member States also con-
tribute towards ﬁ  nancing the British rebate ; the fact that 
these countries, which are all signiﬁ  cantly poorer than the 
United Kingdom, help to pay for the British rebate is a 
major criticism of the system.
1.2.4 Expenditure
Over the past twenty-ﬁ  ve years, the EU’s expenditure has 
been concentrated primarily on :
–   agriculture, ﬁ  nanced by the “guarantee” section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund 
(EAGGF) ; spending on price support and farm incomes 
has traditionally made up the bulk of EU expenditure, 
but the trend is clearly downward  : in the early 1980s, 
this expenditure represented almost 70 p.c. of the total 
EU budget, but currently accounts for only 44 p.c. ;
–   the structural funds and the cohesion fund (SCF)  : the 
reduced expenditure on agriculture over the years was 
largely offset by higher spending via the SCF. The share 
represented by these funds has risen from around 11 
p.c. in the early 1980s to roughly 31 p.c. in recent 
years ;
–   foreign policy : taking a broad deﬁ  nition of expenditure 
on foreign policy, e.g. by including in that category the 
expenditure under the pre-accession strategy and the 
















CHART 3  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU’S OWN 
RESOURCES AND OPERATING BUDGETARY 
BALANCE OF THE MEMBER STATES
  (Payments, 2004)
Source : EC.
(1)  Taking account of the British rebate.































































































































































































Operating budgetary balance 
(p.c. of GNI) 
Contribution to the EU’s own 
resources (1) (p.c. of GNI) 
Per capita GDP (2) 
(right-hand scale) 













CHART 4  STRUCTURE OF EU EXPENDITURE (1)
  (Percentages of the total)
Source : EC.




Structural funds and cohesion fund
Agricultural expenditure (excluding Guidance Section)
Foreign policy, pre-accession support and 
European Development Fund54
10 p.c. of total expenditure, whereas in the early 1980s 
the ﬁ  gure was only about 7 p.c. ;
–   research and development : EU expenditure on research 
and development has risen from 2 p.c. to just over 
4 p.c. of total expenditure ;
–   administration  : in the past few decades, expenditure 
on the operation of the administration has made up a 
fairly constant proportion of the EU budget, at around 
6 p.c.
In all, expenditure on agriculture and the SCF together has 
traditionally made up more than three-quarters of the EU 
budget. Furthermore, the main shifts in EU expenditure 
since 1980 have occurred in these two items, whereas 
the share of the other categories of expenditure has 
remained largely stable. The agricultural policy and the 
cohesion policy will therefore be described in more detail 
in section 2.
1.2.5  Net contributor and net beneﬁ  ciary Member States
The “operating budgetary balances” – i.e., the difference 
between a Member State’s contribution to the EU and 
the share of allocated expenditure it receives from the EU, 
hence excluding administrative expenditure – indicate that 
in 2004, the latest year for which data are available, the 
richest Member States were generally net contributors to 
the EU budget, although the size of their net contribution 
was not proportional to their relative income position 
(cf. chart 3). This is due to the United Kingdom’s rebate 
and the fact that Member States with a relatively large 
number of farmers in their labour force (e.g. France) 
or with signiﬁ   cant internal regional income inequality 
(Germany) receive relatively more from the EU budget via 
the CAP or the cohesion policy. The less wealthy EU-15 
Member States, such as Spain, Greece and Portugal, are 
major net beneﬁ   ciaries, principally via the SCF. All the 
new Member States are also net beneﬁ  ciaries,  notably 
the Baltic countries which are among the poorest Member 
States and receive a relatively large amount of support.
If the EU’s administrative expenditure is attributed to the 
Member States where it is effected (the “budget bal-
ances”), that makes a signiﬁ  cant difference for the two 
Member States which are home to most of the European 
institutions, namely Belgium and Luxembourg. These two 
countries then become net beneﬁ  ciaries instead of net 
contributors to the EU budget. Belgium, in particular, 
opposed the use of the budget balance concept, espe-
cially in the context of the negotiations on the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013, and put forward the following 
main arguments against the calculation of these budget 
balances :
–   the salaries of ofﬁ  cials paid in Brussels are not spent 
entirely in Belgium ;
–   this argument is particularly valid in the case of pen-
sions, which are largely paid to ofﬁ  cials who have left 
Brussels ;
–   the payment of salaries, rents, etc. represents compen-
sation for the use of scarce factors of production, and 
is not the same as a free transfer.
More general arguments have been put forward against 
the calculation of the “operating budgetary balances” 
and “budget balances” :
–   the EU is based on solidarity, and it is inappropriate 
for each Member State to calculate its proﬁ  t (the “fair 
return” principle) and to include this aspect in the 
budget debate ;
–   expenditure in one particular Member State may directly 
beneﬁ  t another Member State, e.g. the construction of 
an airport in Greece by a German contractor ;
–   this attributable expenditure usually has indirect favour-
able effects on other EU Member States (“spillover”), 
e.g. by boosting imports.
2.   The agricultural and cohesion 
policies
2.1 Agricultural  policy
The CAP expenditure is ﬁ   nanced by the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). This 
fund, set up in 1962, in the early years of the EU, com-
prises two sections :
–   the Guarantee section of the Fund mainly ﬁ  nances 
expenditure on price support for agricultural products 
(the “common organisation of the agricultural mar-
kets”) and the accompanying measures, particularly 
those concerning rural development and veterinary 
measures ;
–   The Guidance section ﬁ  nances the other expenditure 
on rural development, which is incorporated in the 
expenditure on the cohesion policy (cf. below).
During its existence, the CAP has undergone some major 
changes, and the modiﬁ  cations are continuing. Below is a 
very brief account of the key aspects of those changes.
With the creation of the European Economic Community, 
the CAP acquired a very important role, notably in the 
context of a broad political agreement between Germany 
– which saw many advantages in the prospects of the 
customs union and single market – and France, which 
was pleased to transfer its generous agricultural support 55
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to European level. The aims of the CAP as stated in the 
EU Treaty (Article 33) – namely to increase agricultural 
productivity and assure the security of supplies (an aim 
inspired by the food shortages following World War II), to 
ensure a reasonable income for farmers and to stabilise 
markets, as well as ensuring reasonable prices for con-
sumers – were achieved for a number of decades via a 
system of minimum prices for most agricultural products 
combined with “Community preference”, which means 
that high import duties and export subsidies kept the 
pricing of agricultural products within the EU’s common 
market isolated from the world market.
The aim of self-sufﬁ   ciency was achieved fairly quickly, 
and in the long run the price guarantees actually led to 
surpluses, which absorbed an ever-increasing share of the 
EU budget. Despite the milk lakes and butter mountains, 
European consumers still paid higher prices than those 
prevailing on the world market.  (1) Moreover, in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), the agricultural policy brought 
the EU into conﬂ  ict with other members such as the US, 
New Zealand, Australia and Canada, and took opportu-
nities away from developing countries, especially those 
dependent on exports of agricultural products. Finally, 
people became increasingly concerned about the adverse 
environmental impact of excess production.
In these circumstances, the CAP has undergone sys-
tematic reform since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
blueprint produced by Commissioner Mac Sharry in 
1992 laid the foundations for a new policy, centred on 
limiting output-linked price support and replacing it 
with more direct income support. This was intended to 
bring agricultural production more into line with market 
demand, and to reduce the surpluses. The “Agenda 
2000” reforms – approved in 1999 at the Berlin European 
Council – were the logical continuation of this change of 
direction in agricultural policy, against the background 
of the impending EU enlargement and in anticipation 
of a new round of WTO negotiations. The enlargement 
represented a huge challenge for the CAP, in view of the 
still considerable share of the agricultural sector in the 
then candidate Member States. Finally, the 2003 reform 
(Luxembourg, 26 June 2003) introduced the principle 
of “decoupling”, whereby direct income support or a 
single payment scheme was available on the basis of 
historical references without any link to production, sub-
ject to compliance with certain criteria concerning respect 
for the environment, food safety and other aspects 
(“cross-compliance”). This new scheme came into effect 
in 2005 for most of the EU-15 Member States, including 
Belgium, and subsequently for the other Member States 
as well. Ultimately, the aim is to reduce direct income 
support too, in favour of rural development and other 
general support measures.  (2)
This reform of the CAP is reﬂ  ected in the scale and struc-
ture of the expenditure. Not only, as already stated, is 
the CAP expenditure declining as a percentage of total 
EU expenditure, its composition is also changing. Up to 
1991, the support consisted solely of export subsidies and 
market or price support, but from 1992 onwards this was 
increasingly replaced by direct support, with the addition 
of rural development aid from 1995. In recent years, price 
support and export subsidies together have accounted for 
less than one-ﬁ  fth of total agricultural expenditure.
The extent to which the EU still protects its agriculture, 
even after these reforms, can be compared internation-
ally on the basis of the surveys published regularly by the 
OECD (OECD, 2006), on the basis of the “Total Support 
Estimate”, i.e. the sum of all the support received by 
















































































CHART 5  EU EXPENDITURE ON AGRICULTURE (1)
  (Percentages of the total)
Source : EC.




Export subsidies (and price support for 2005 
and 2006)
(1)  Since the main food producing countries pursue a policy of self-sufﬁ  ciency, the 
world markets in foodstuffs tend to be “residual” markets where surpluses are 
dumped. Consequently, the prices on those markets are not entirely in line with 
the operation of a free market.
(2)  At the Brussels Summit of 24 and 25 October 2002, which resolved the last 
obstacles to enlargement, an agreement was concluded whereby the agricultural 
policy would remain unchanged up to 2006 in exchange for a ceiling on 
the growth of expenditure between 2007 and 2013 of no more than 1 p.c. 
per annum. Direct support for farmers in the new Member States was to be 
introduced as follows : 25 p.c. in 2004, 30 p.c. in 2005, 35 p.c. in 2006, and 
40 p.c. in 2007, thereafter increasing by 10 p.c. per annum so that, by 2013, the 
new Member States would be receiving the same direct support as those of the 
EU-15.56
This support takes two forms  : the part paid to the pro-
ducer out of general resources – taxation – and the part 
ﬁ  nanced implicitly by the consumer in so far as the agri-
cultural policy involves relatively higher consumer prices. 
Government revenues generated by levies on agricultural 
products are deducted from this ﬁ  gure. This indicator has 
the advantage of being exhaustive and also permitting 
international comparison over time.
Comparison between two periods, namely 1986-1988 
(before the CAP reform) and 2003-2005 (the most recent 
period for which statistics are available) for a number of 
major food producing and exporting countries reveals the 
following ﬁ  ndings :
–   total support is highest in Japan and the EU, whereas 
the agricultural policy in New Zealand and Australia is 
closest to a free market policy ;
–   the rate of total support (as a percentage of GDP) 
has fallen in all the countries mentioned, being cut 
by roughly half in Japan, the EU, the US and Canada. 
During the period considered, New Zealand made the 
most radical change of policy, drastically reducing its 
support for agriculture ;
–   in Japan and the EU, much of the support takes the 
form of “hidden” levies, primarily higher prices for 
consumers.
Given the high level of protection for the European 
agricultural sector in international terms, the question is 
to what extent the CAP has achieved its original objec-
tives. Key factors in that connection are the trend in farm 
incomes and the extent to which food self-sufﬁ  ciency has 
been assured by the CAP.
Measured on the basis of the total added value per full-
time farm worker, the average farm income in the EU-15 
has been volatile and, of course, that is largely due to 
ﬂ   uctuating output and the volatility of certain prices, 
typical of the agricultural sector. Between 1993 (the year 
following the adoption of the Mac Sharry blueprint) and 
1997, farm incomes increased systematically before level-
ling out. Overall, the increase between 1995 and 2003 
averaged 0.5 p.c. per annum, much less than the average 
rise in all EU-15 incomes, which came to roughly 2 p.c. 
per annum. However, there were wide variations between 
countries : Belgium, Spain and Portugal were the countries 
where farm incomes showed the largest increase during 
that period, whereas Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom saw the sharpest decline. The reasons for 
these variations lie in the divergent production structures 
and epidemics such as “mad cow disease” (BSE) in the 
United Kingdom. Most of the new Member States also 
saw farm incomes decline during the period considered, 
TABLE 1 SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON (1)
(Billions of euros, unless otherwise stated)
Japan EU US
1986-1988 2003-2005 1986-1988 2003-2005 1986-1988 2003-2005
Financed by consumers ...................... 50.5 49.5 80.7 52.9 13.5 10.2
Financed out of taxes ....................... 12.9 14.3 25.0 68.4 46.4 75.5
Government revenues ....................... –10.7 –13.1 –1.5 –0.6 –1.4 –1.5
Total ..................................... 52.7 50.7 104.2 120.6 58.6 84.2
Percentage of GDP .......................... 2.36 1.35 2.77 1.23 1.35 0.87
Canada New Zealand Australia
1986-1988 2003-2005 1986-1988 2003-2005 1986-1988 2003-2005
Financed by consumers ...................... 2.9 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0
Financed out of taxes ....................... 4.0 4.4 0.5 0.2 1.2 1.6
Government revenues ....................... 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total ..................................... 6.9 6.6 0.5 0.3 1.6 1.6
Percentage of GDP .......................... 1.77 0.80 1.71 0.38 0.82 0.32
Source: OECD.
(1) Measured on the basis of the “Total Support Estimate” concept, average over three years.57
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but since their accession in 2004, there has been a 
relatively steep increase in farm incomes, particularly in 
Poland, because the application of the EU guaranteed 
prices led to higher prices in those countries, and also 
because the direct income supplement is relatively signiﬁ  -
cant there in relation to the low farm incomes.
The degree of self-sufﬁ  ciency, deﬁ  ned as domestic pro-
duction in relation to domestic consumption, has risen 
sharply. Immediately after World War II, the EU was still 
a net importer of many agricultural products, but nowa-
days it has long been self-sufﬁ  cient in all the principal 
agricultural products. However, the question is to what 
extent that is due to the CAP, since the level of 100 p.c. 
self-  sufﬁ  ciency has been exceeded not only in the case of 
cereals, meat, milk, sugar and wine, which receive sub-
stantial aid under the CAP, but also for other agricultural 
and horticultural products.
2.2 Cohesion  policy
As already explained, the ﬁ  nancial resources assigned to 
the SCF represent a growing proportion of the EU budget. 
The accession of the new Member States has exacerbated 
the problem of income discrepancies and regional conver-
gence within the EU, which would mean a growing need 
for ﬁ  nance for the SCF if the policy remains unchanged.
2.2.1  Objectives and instruments
Although the objective of greater cohesion between 
the Member States was endorsed right from the start of 
European integration,  (1) one did not feel the urgent need 
at that time to provide explicit support for this aim via a 
regional policy, primarily because the founding members 
of the Union had already reached a relatively similar level 
of economic development. It is only since the 1980s, fol-
lowing the accession of a number of poorer, southern 
European countries (Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain 
in 1986), that the EU has become increasingly concerned 
about its internal economic and social cohesion. While the 
creation of a single market held the promise of growing 
prosperity, there arose at the same time the question of 
how that prosperity would be shared among the various 
countries and regions. Following the Single European Act, 
the Treaty expressly included the aim of reducing dispa-
rities between the levels of development of the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least   favoured 
regions or islands, including rural areas (Article 158 of the 
Treaty). This formed the basis for a genuine regional policy 
in the EU, conducted also via the structural funds and, 
since 1994, via the cohesion fund.
The structural funds are used for three priority interven-
tion objectives under the Financial Perspective for the 
period 2000-2006 (also known as “Agenda 2000”) :
1.   the development and structural adjustment of regions 
whose development is lagging behind. These are 
regions where the average per capita GDP is below 
75 p.c. of the European Union average ;
2.   support for the economic and social conversion of 
regions facing structural difﬁ  culties, other than those 
eligible for Objective 1 support ;
3.   all measures to promote employment – notably 
concerning training – except in regions eligible for 
Objective 1 support.
These tasks are divided among four structural funds :
–   the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 
mainly grants support to backward regions and regions 
undergoing economic conversion (Objectives 1 and 2) ;
–   the European Social Fund (ESF) is primarily concerned 
with the European employment strategy (covering the 
three objectives) ;
–   the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund (EAGGF), “Guidance“ section, contributes to 
the development and structural adjustment of regions 
whose development is lagging behind (by augmenting 
the efﬁ  ciency of the structures of production, proces-
sing and sale of agricultural and forestry products) and 
to the development of rural areas (mainly Objective 1) ;
–   the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), 
which is less important, supports structural changes in 
the ﬁ  sheries sector (Objective 1).
In contrast to the structural funds, which are aimed at 
regions, the cohesion fund is intended to strengthen eco-
nomic and social cohesion between the Member States. 
Only the Member States whose per capita GNI is less 
than 90 p.c. of the Union average qualify for ﬁ  nancial 
support. This fund was set up in 1994 to make it easier 
for the poorer Member States to continue making up the 
leeway in terms of public infrastructure while at the same 
time satisfying the Maastricht criteria regarding public 
ﬁ  nances.
The Financial Perspective for 2000-2006 earmarks around 
233 billion euro (at 2004 prices) altogether for the struc-
tural funds and the cohesion fund intended for the EU-15. 
Following the accession of the new Member States, that 
budget ﬁ  gure was increased by around 24 billion euro. 
Rather less than two-thirds of the total ﬁ  nancing  was 
(1)  The preamble to the Treaty of Rome (1957) refers to the desire “…to strengthen 
the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development 
by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the less favoured regions.”58
intended for Objective 1, while Objectives 2 and 3 and the 
cohesion fund each accounted for more or less one-tenth. 
The rest was intended primarily for ﬁ  nancing Community 
initiatives and innovative actions via the INTERREG, 
URBAN, EQUAL and LEADER programmes. The Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013 speciﬁ  es an amount of 308 billion 
euro (2004 prices) for the SCF.  (1)
Since the end of the 1980s, in line with the cohesion 
policy objectives, most of the SCF resources have gone 
to the less prosperous regions in the south of the Union. 
Between 1989 and 1993, and between 1994 and 1999, 
all the regions of Greece, Ireland and Portugal met the 
criteria for structural support under Objective 1, as did 
large areas of Spain. Together, these four countries 
received around two-thirds of the resources allocated 
under Objective 1, the main component of the structural 
funds. During 2000-2006, the combined share of these 
four countries in the Objective 1 resources declined, 
partly because large regions of Ireland ceased to meet 
the criteria. Since the ﬁ  rst half of the 1990s, Germany 
also received a substantial part of those resources, and 
Italy is also traditionally a major beneﬁ   ciary of such 
funds. Moreover, up to 2003, Greece, Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal were the sole beneﬁ  ciaries of the cohesion fund 
(they were known as the four “cohesion fund countries”). 
Since January 2004, Ireland has ceased to qualify  ; in 
contrast, all the new Member States which joined the EU 
in May 2004 meet the cohesion fund conditions. In the 
light of the criteria for the allocation of the resources, 
it looks as if the share of the former EU-15 countries in 
the SCF will decline sharply under the Financial Perspective 
2007-2013, in favour of the new Member States, includ-
ing Bulgaria and Romania. Thus, according to the esti-
mates of the Ministry of the Walloon Region, published 
by the Federal Planning Bureau (Hennart et al., 2006), the 
overall budget for the SCF for the former EU-15 under 
the Financial Perspective 2007-2013 will be 27 p.c. less 
TABLE 2  STRUCTURAL FUNDS AND INSTRUMENTS PROVIDED BY THE FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 2000-2006
(Billions of euros (1), unless otherwise stated)
Objective 1 Objectives
2 and 3











EU-15 ..................................... 150.1 50.9 19.7 12.6 233.3 –27
of which:
Germany .............................. 22.0 8.8 1.9 32.8 –17
France ................................ 4.2 11.6 1.4 17.2 –19
Italy ................................... 24.4 6.9 1.4 32.7 –11
Netherlands ............................ 0.1 2.7 0.8 3.6 –52
Belgium ............................... 0.7 1.3 0.3 2.3 –7
p.m. So-called four “cohesion fund countries”
Greece ................................ 23.1 3.4 1.0 27.5 –19
Spain ................................. 42.1 5.3 12.4 2.4 62.1 –41
Ireland ................................ 3.4 0.6 0.2 4.2 –72
Portugal ............................... 21.0 3.4 0.7 25.1 –15
New Member States (2) ....................... 15.0 0.3 8.5 0.7 24.5
Sources: EC and Hennart F., Saintrain M. and Vergeynst T. (2006).
(1) 2004 prices for EU-15 and current prices for the new Member States.
(2) 2004-2006 for the new Member States.
(3) Estimate by the Ministry of the Walloon Region in Hennart F., Saintrain M. and Vergeynst T. (2006), table 16.
(1)  A part of these new resources is intended for “phasing out” measures, notably 
4.1 p.c. for the EU-15 regions which, owing to the statistical effect of the new 
accessions, are no longer eligible for assistance under the Convergence objective 
(per capita GDP less than 75 p.c. of the EU-15 average but more than 75 p.c. of 
that of the EU 25), and 3.4 p.c. for degressive transitional support for the regions 
which come under the current Objective 1 and which, in 2007, owing to their 
economic progress, no longer qualify for the Convergence objective (“phasing in” 
under the Regional Competitiveness and Employment Objective).59
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than under the Financial Perspective 2000-2006. Belgium 
would see the smallest reduction, at roughly 7 p.c. These 
shifts imply a signiﬁ  cant fall in the share of the former 
EU-15  : having totalled around 90 p.c. of the SCF 
under the Financial Perspective 2000-2006, that share 
is expected to drop to some 50 p.c. under the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013 (Grybauskaite, 2006).
2.2.2  Convergence within the European Union
These developments concerning the SCF raise the ques-
tion whether the EU has indeed achieved greater con-
vergence in income levels and – if so – what has been 
the role of ﬁ   nancial support via the SCF. Convergence 
can be measured in various ways. For instance, the per 
capita GDP of a region or country can be compared with 
the average. If this is applied to the four former cohesion 
fund countries, it is evident that the difference between 
the average income in the former EU-15 and that of 
those four countries has declined considerably, overall, as 
the years have gone by  (1), indicating a tendency towards 
convergence.
However, this change did not proceed steadily over 
time. Even before their accession to the Union, namely 
in the 1960s, the countries concerned, except Ireland, 
had caught up considerably, but their catching up 
slowed down signiﬁ  cantly during the crisis of the 1970s. 
Following accession to the European Community (1981), 
Greece experienced a marked fall in its level of prosperity 
relative to the EU average. Only since the new millennium 
has Greece once again started to catch up. In contrast, 
in Spain and Portugal the accession to the European 
Community in the mid-1980s marked the start of an 
accelerated process of catching up. Finally, for Ireland 
the turning point did not come until the late 1980s. That 
country, which had been a member of the Union since as 
far back as 1973, had seen hardly any improvement in 
its relative income level for decades, but in the 1990s it 
became a leading growth centre, so that by 2005 its per 
capita GDP was actually a quarter above the EU average.
Formal accession was therefore evidently not an essential 
condition for growth to catch up, as is clear from the trend 
in incomes during the 1960s in three of the four countries 
mentioned above. Nor was accession to the Union suf-
ﬁ  cient to ensure convergence  : indeed, the catching-up 
process accelerated in Spain and Portugal, but not in 
Ireland and Greece. However, it is also signiﬁ  cant that the 
catching-up process in Spain, Portugal and Ireland since 
the end of the 1980s coincided with the growing impor-
tance of the structural funds in the EU budget.
Looking at the allocation of incomes between the regions, 
it appears that, during recent decades, the trend towards 
convergence has often been less marked than at national 
level in the four cohesion fund countries. In that regard, 
it is sometimes referred to a certain “trade-off” between 
national and regional convergence : owing to the growth 
poles effects in the initial phases of growth, countries 
which are in a catching-up phase may encounter widen-
ing regional disparity. Also, some interregional disparities 
appear to be very persistent (EC, 2000  ; Ederveen et al., 
2002).
2.2.3   Role of the structural funds and the cohesion fund 
in the convergence within the European Union
Opinions differ as regards the contribution of the cohe-
sion policy towards the convergence of incomes between 
regions. Naturally, if the SCF are to have any long-term 
impact, these resources must be allocated efﬁ  ciently 
to providing support for the production potential, e.g. 
by improving the infrastructure, upgrading the skills of 
the workers or by research and development, and they 
must not cause any distortion in the operation of the 
market. Those who are sceptical about the common 















CHART 6  PER CAPITA GDP IN THE FOUR COHESION 
FUND COUNTRIES (1)
  (Purchasing power parity, former EU-15 = 100)
Source : EC.





































































































(1)  Throughout this section, per capita GDP is adjusted for variations in purchasing 
power. This adjustment is necessary because the level of prices in the less 
prosperous countries is normally below that seen in the wealthier countries.60
For instance, they say that the ﬁ  nancial support given to the 
former East Germany via subsidies excessively encouraged 
investment in sectors which are too capital-intensive in 
relative terms, and investments in buildings. These last 
investments did not favour productivity in the former 
East Germany. There is also the potential worry about 
“displacement effects”  : national governments receiving 
support for certain backward regions tend to scale down 
their planned national investments so that, in the end, 
nothing extra would be invested in those regions. The 
obligation to apply the principle of “additionality” indi-
cates that the EU is aware of this danger.
These prior considerations underline the need for a direct 
evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of the cohesion 
policy. While studies based on macroeconomic models 
generally conclude, in this connection, that the SCF have 
a positive effect on the GDP of the beneﬁ  ciary countries, 
econometric analysis – in contrast – does not permit clear 
conclusions.
In order to assess the macroeconomic effects of the SCF, 
the HERMIN model – based on an existing model for the 
Irish economy – was developed (ESRI, 2002). This model 
estimated the effect of the SCF support granted between 
1994 and 1999 for various countries, including Ireland, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. A distinction was made 
between the immediate short-term demand effects and 
the medium and long-term supply effects. Regarding the 
latter, close attention was paid to the possible external 
effects which may inﬂ   uence the economy, e.g. via an 
increase in factor productivity, particularly as a result of 
improvements to the infrastructure and better training for 
the labour force. However, the estimation of those effects 
requires a number of crucial assumptions, e.g. concern-
ing the return on the funds invested in education and 
training. In the case of the four cohesion fund countries, 
these simulations revealed a positive combined effect of 
the SCF on the GDP of the beneﬁ  ciary countries between 
1994 and 1999. That is not really surprising, since, accord-
ing to that model, ﬁ  nancial aid also has a direct effect on 
GDP via demand. Taking account of the amount of the 
ﬁ  nancial resources used, the estimated relative increase in 
GDP resulting from the SCF, viewed cumulatively over the 
years 1994 to 1999, was considerably greater for Ireland 
than the funding granted as a percentage of GDP. In Spain 
and Portugal, the cumulative multiplier calculated in this 
way came to about 1, but in Greece it was only about 
two-thirds. Considered over a longer period, namely 
from 1994 to 2010, during which supply effects may also 
be reﬂ  ected in additional growth after the funding has 
ceased, it is estimated that the SCF aid to Ireland will have 
been recouped about three times. In Portugal and Spain, 
this long-term multiplier comes to roughly 2.5 and 2 
respectively, but in Greece it would only be just over 1, 
even after 17 years.
The HERMIN model was also used to produce an ex ante 
estimation of the macroeconomic effects of the SCF in 
2000-2006 for a number of countries, including the four 
cohesion fund countries. Once again, the results point 
to positive joint demand and supply effects. The ex ante 
estimation based on the European Commission’s QUEST II 
model also reveals positive combined demand and supply 
effects, but they are considerably smaller because of sig-
niﬁ  cant differences in the basic assumptions. The QUEST II 
estimates nonetheless conﬁ  rm that supply side effects are 
created in the longer term, which would be roughly of the 
same magnitude as the effects estimated on the basis of 
the HERMIN model (EC, 2000).
Ex ante estimates were also produced using the HERMIN 
model for the reform of the cohesion policy under the 
new Financial Perspective 2007-2013. According to 
these estimates, the GDP of some of the new Member 
States and accession candidates would be around 10 p.c. 
greater, or even more, in 2013 than without the SCF 
support (Bradley and Morgenroth, 2004). Thus, the 
money invested under the new cohesion policy would 
be recouped 1.5 or 2 times in most of the new Member 
States during the ﬁ   nancing period 2007-2013, and 
– considered over 2007-2020, i.e. a period ending sev-
eral years after the end of the ﬁ  nancing period – the 
multiplier would actually be 2.5 or more. However, in 
the former East Germany, the Italian Mezzogiorno and 
particularly in Greece, the long-term return on the SCF 
would be considerably lower.
Other macroeconomic models developed for particular 
Member States also often arrive at the conclusion that 
the EU’s cohesion policy makes a signiﬁ  cant contribution 
to growth and employment in the beneﬁ  ciary countries. 
Yet the results of econometric research, which is less 
dependent on the initial basic assumptions, present a 
mixed picture  : some studies point to positive but some-
times modest effects, while others indicate insigniﬁ  cant 
or even negative results (Ederveen et al., 2002). There 
are also considerable variations between countries and 
regions. A frequent conclusion is that the effectiveness of 
the SCF depends very much on a number of basic condi-
tions, which means that the regional policy would be 
mainly beneﬁ  cial in an environment conducive to growth. 
In this regard, Ederveen et al. (2002, 2006) conclude that 
regional aid produces positive effects primarily in open 
economies such as Ireland, whereas closed economies 
would gain far less from it.61
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The appraisal of the SCF is therefore not unanimously 
positive. Increasing the impact of the current European 
cohesion policy represents a major challenge. The fact 
that the European institutions have recognised the need 
to reorganise the SCF is clear from the reform of the cohe-
sion policy speciﬁ  ed in the new Financial Perspective 2007-
2013, to be discussed in more detail below. However, it is 
by no means certain that those changes will be sufﬁ  cient, 
and it is vital to continue the constant assessment of the 
cohesion policy.
3.   The Financial Perspective 2007-2013
The initial version of the Financial Perspective for 
2007-2013 – the fourth in the series – was presented to 
the European Parliament in February 2004 by the then 
President of the Commission, Romano Prodi. As already 
mentioned, the Financial Perspective reﬂ  ects the general 
stance of EU policy over a fairly long period – currently 
7 years – and determines the maximum amount per head-
ing for each annual budget. The expenditure is allocated 
within each heading, at the time of the annual budget 
round. Hereafter, the EC’s original proposal is ﬁ  rst  dis-
cussed. Since this proposal was not greeted with equal 
enthusiasm by all the Member States, the Luxembourg 
Presidency arrived at a compromise in mid-2005 which 
the European Council subsequently approved, in slightly 
modiﬁ  ed form, under the British Presidency in December 
2005. This agreement is explained in section 3.2. The 
ﬁ   nal section describes the Interinstitutional Agreement 
concluded between the EC, the Council and the European 
Parliament on 17 May 2006.
3.1  The Commission proposal
The proposal by the European Commission “Building our 
common future” (EC, 2004) deﬁ  ned three priorities  (1) :
–   promoting sustainable development. This refers prima-
rily to the Lisbon Strategy (European Council, 2000) 
which aims to make the EU a leading knowledge-based 
economy. In addition, the cohesion policy must focus 
more than in the past on pursuing the objectives of 
that strategy since a properly targeted approach in this 
area will mobilise the Union’s unused potential. Finally, 
natural resources require sustainable management. 
The new agricultural policy is to implement this by 
breaking the link between support and production ;
–   citizenship, freedom, security and justice. The second 
priority implements the conclusions of the Tampere 
European Council in 1999, which gave the EU more 
powers over immigration and asylum policy and in 
regard to the ﬁ  ght against crime and terrorism ;
–    the EU in the world. The third priority aims to allow the 
EU to play a greater role as a regional leader and as a 
global partner. This should bring the Union’s political 
clout more into line with its economic importance.
In order to achieve these ambitious objectives in an 
enlarged Union, the Commission suggested gradually 
increasing the expenditure commitment, raising it to 
1.23 p.c. of GNI by 2013. For comparison, approximately 
1.11 p.c. of GNI was scheduled for 2006 (excluding 
the EDF expenditure  ; this had been included in the 
Commission proposal for 2013, but the Council and 
the European Parliament had later excluded it from the 
budget). The expenditure would thus remain within the 
absolute ceiling on the own resources with due regard, 
on the one hand, for existing commitments and the likely 
challenges ahead in respect of agricultural ﬁ  nancing and 
the cohesion policy, resulting from the recent enlargement 
and that planned for the future, and on the other hand 
for the consensus achieved at the highest political level 
concerning the new impetus to be given to the Lisbon 
strategy. In addition, the Commission suggested to abolish 
the special rebate on the British contribution and replace 
it with a generalised correction mechanism guaranteeing 
all the poorer Member States a partial rebate.  (2)
To highlight these priorities, the European Commission 
changed the current expenditure headings into the fol-
lowing categories :
1. Sustainable growth, divided into two sub-headings :
 1a  :    Competitiveness for growth and employment
 1b  :    Cohesion for growth and employment
2. Preservation and management of natural resources :
 –    agriculture market-related expenditure and direct 
payments ;
 –    preservation and management of natural resources, 
excluding the CAP
3. Citizenship, freedom, security and justice
4. The EU as a global partner
5. Administration
(1)  These three priorities refer in fact to the “three pillars” of the EU as laid down in 
the Maastricht Treaty : the European Communities (economic affairs, EMU, etc.), 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs, although 
the European Commission reverses the order of the last two.
(2)  The principle of a generalised correction had already been accepted at the 
European Summit in Fontainebleau (1984) : “… any Member State sustaining 
a budgetary burden which is excessive in relation to its relative prosperity may 
beneﬁ  t from a correction at the appropriate time.” However, this principle has 






























CHART 7  COMPARISON OF THE EXPENDITURE BREAKDOWN: 2006 BUDGET, COMMISSION PROPOSAL, EUROPEAN COUNCIL 
AGREEMENT AND INTERINSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENT FOR 2013 (1)
  (Percentages)
Sources : EC, Council of the European Union.
(1)  Commitment appropriations, 2004 prices. All expenditure on administration was concentrated under the heading of that name, not divided among the other headings as was 
done by the Commission in its proposals; the EDF expenditure was also excluded, for ease of comparability.
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The most notable development was the growing impor-
tance assigned by the Commission to expenditure on 
“Competitiveness for growth and employment” (Lisbon 
agenda), an item which would have expanded from 7 p.c. 
of the total commitment appropriations in 2006 to over 
16 p.c. in 2013. This increase was at the expense of the 
amount allocated to agriculture, except for the expendi-
ture on protecting the environment, i.e. in broad terms 
the price and income support, down from approximately 
36 p.c. of total spending to around 26 p.c.
The “Cohesion for growth and employment” heading, 
though larger in absolute terms, was set to remain con-
stant at around 31 p.c. of the total commitment appro-
priations. As already stated, the European Commission 
proposed a reform of the cohesion policy via the Financial 
Perspective 2007-2013. The aim is to focus the measures 
more on the Union’s strategic guidelines (Lisbon strategy 
and employment strategy), concentrating them on the 
least favoured regions and stepping up their decentralisa-
tion, making their implementation simpler, more trans-
parent and more effective. To that end, the current three 
priorities will be replaced by the following objectives  : 
“Convergence” (around 79 p.c. of SCF resources) – the 
aim being to accelerate the economic convergence of the 
least developed regions, particularly those with per capita 
GDP below 75 p.c. of the EU average following enlarge-
ment, and therefore close to the current Objective 1 –, 
“Regional competitiveness and employment” (around 
17 p.c.), and “European territorial cooperation” (around 
4 p.c.). The existing ﬁ   nancial instruments will also be 
reduced to three, namely the ERDF, the ESF and the 
Cohesion Fund.
The share of the item “Preservation and management of 
natural resources, excluding the CAP” is down slightly in 
percentage terms, but higher in millions of euros, whereas 
the expenditure on “Citizenship, freedom, security and 
justice” and “The EU as a global partner” is increased in 
percentage terms.
3.2   The European Council agreement of December 
2005
The Commission proposals were greeted with scepticism 
by almost all the Member States :
–   the proposed increase in the budget encountered 
resistance from the six Member States which contrib-
ute most to the EU budget, namely Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom and 
Sweden ;
–   the United Kingdom opposed the introduction of a 
generalised correction mechanism ;
–   France, in common with some other Member States, 
considered it very important to maintain the agricultural 
expenditure at a higher level than that proposed by the 
Commission ;
–   the redistribution of the SCF, intended for the poorest 
Member States, was criticised by a number of countries, 
including Belgium, which advocated a broad “phasing 
out” of the SCF over a long period.
The Luxembourg Presidency during the ﬁ  rst half of 2005 
suggested a compromise, but in the last instance it was 
rejected. However, the United Kingdom, which held the 
presidency during the second half of 2005, ultimately felt 
obliged to put forward a proposal which was not all that 
different from the Luxembourg compromise, except that 
the level of expenditure was lowered again slightly and 
many ad hoc elements were added which, though condu-
cive to political agreement, made the Financial Perspective 
less transparent. In December 2005 the European Council 
concluded the following agreement :
–   the expenditure ceiling was set at 1.045 p.c. of GNI for 
commitment appropriations and 0.99 p.c. of GNI for 
payment appropriations (on average for 2007-2013), 
excluding the EDF, which was separated from the 
budget (the EDF represents around 0.02 p.c. of GNI). 
In 2013, the ﬁ  nal year of the Financial Perspective, the 
commitment appropriations would amount to just 1 p.c. 
of GNI, thus meeting the demand of the six largest net 
contributors ;
–   the allocation of the expenditure was revised in the 
direction of the existing expenditure structure  : more 
spending on agriculture and the SCF than in the 
Commission proposal, and less spending on the imple-
mentation of the Lisbon objectives (“Competitiveness 
for growth and employment”) ;
–   the expenditure cuts were allowed partly by reducing 
expenditure on rural development, which is one reason 
for the Flemish Region’s critics on the agreement ;
–   compared to the Commission proposal, the SCF is 
somewhat less concentrated on the new Member 
States, and the apportionment is more in line with 
the current allocation. In addition, a long “phasing 
out” period is provided in the case of the regions and 
Member States which would cease to satisfy the criteria 
for granting aid in the enlarged Union (Hainaut, for 
example) ;
–   the British rebate is retained, but will be gradually 
reduced between 2009 and 2011 as regards the British 
ﬁ  nancing of the costs of EU enlargement (the British 
nonetheless keep their rebate in respect of the CAP 
expenditure) ;
–   while the uniform “call rate’’ for the VAT resource is 
set at 0.30 p.c., Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden receive a reduction in their VAT contribution  ; 64
an additional lump sum reduction is also granted to 
the last two countries in respect of their share in the 
fourth resource. Overall, the Netherlands gains the 
most from the revision of the own resources decision, 
since its contribution is down by an average of 22 p.c. 
per annum, or almost 1 billion euro (Federal Planning 
Bureau, 2006) ;
–   a fundamental revision of the EU budget expenditure 
and revenue is planned for 2008-2009, which should 
permit renewed discussion of all the components of 
Community expenditure (including the CAP) and the 
British rebate.
3.3  The Interinstitutional Agreement
The Financial Perspective approved by the European 
Council came in for sharp criticism from the European 
Parliament, one reason being the small size of the budget 
and the fact that insufﬁ   cient was done for the Lisbon 
objectives. In that sense, the European Parliament defen-
ded the Commission’s original proposal. Following tough 
negotiations between the European Parliament on one 
side and the Council and the Commission on the other, a 
compromise was reached on 4 April 2006, after which a 
new Interinstitutional Agreement was signed by the three 
parties on 17 May. This differs from the December 2005 
agreement on the following points :
–   the expenditure ceiling is raised by 2 billion euro  ; a 
further 2 billion euro is released from the “Emergency 
Aid Reserve” by keeping emergency aid to developing 
countries out of the Financial Perspective, and by cut-
ting expenditure on administration. The European 
Parliament can thus state that it has increased the total 
EU expenditure for 2007-2013 by 4 billion euro, half 
of that being spent on the Lisbon objectives, while the 
European Council only had to agree to increase the 
expenditure from 1 p.c. of GNI to 1.01 p.c. in the year 
2013. The European Investment Bank also undertook to 
co-ﬁ  nance new ﬁ  nancial instruments up to a maximum 
of 2.5 billion euro for expenditure relating to the Lisbon 
objectives ;
–   greater ﬂ  exibility is built in for unforeseen expenditure, 
by increasing the maximum amount spent by a number 
of funds which are not subject to the expenditure 
ceiling, such as the “Solidarity Fund” (which sup-
ports EU Member States affected by a disaster) and 
the “Emergency Aid Reserve” already mentioned, and 
by creating the “European Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund” (which is meant to assist EU Member States 
affected by the impact of globalisation).
Conclusion
The EU budget has a number of speciﬁ  c characteristics 
which make it different from the budgets of the Member 
States  : in principle, it must never be in deﬁ  cit,  and 
there is a special decision-making procedure, in which 
the European Parliament does not have full power. The 
structure and maximum expenditure are speciﬁ  ed for a 
7-year period in the Financial Perspective  ; that for 2007-
2013 was approved in May 2006. In relation to GDP and 
national budgets of the Member States, the EU budget is 
small, but it has grown over the years and recently stabi-
lised at around 1 p.c. of GNI. Import levies and VAT-based 
transfers from the Member States are becoming less 
important as the source of ﬁ  nance for this expenditure, 
which is increasingly funded on the basis of the size of 
each Member State’s GNI. The United Kingdom receives 
a special rebate. The poorer Member States are all net 
beneﬁ  ciaries of the EU budget, while the richer countries 
are net contributors  ; however, if the EU’s administrative 
expenditure in Belgium and Luxembourg is added to what 
those countries receive from the EU, then they become 
both net beneﬁ  ciaries.
Historically, the Common Agricultural Policy was the 
largest EU expenditure item, but its importance is stead-
ily diminishing in favour of expenditure on the cohesion 
policy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a start has been 
made on a fundamental reform of the CAP, culminating in 
the 2003 decisions whereby support for farmers became 
more and more decoupled from production. European 
agricultural prices are also increasingly moving into line 
with world market prices.
Financial resources earmarked for the structural funds 
and the cohesion fund have signiﬁ  cantly increased and 
now exceed 30 p.c. of the EU budget. The growth of per 
capita GDP in the four former ‘cohesion fund countries’ 
compared to the EU average suggests some tendency 
towards economic convergence in the Union. However, 
opinions differ on the contribution made by the cohesion 
policy towards income convergence between regions, 
and a signiﬁ  cant challenge lies ahead in augmenting the 
impact of the current European cohesion policy.
The Commission’s proposals regarding the Financial 
Perspective for 2007-2013 entailed an increase in expen-
diture to 1.23 p.c. of GNI by 2013, and placed the 
emphasis on sustainable development, with a steep rise 
in expenditure on the attainment of the Lisbon objectives. 
However, these proposals went too far for the Member 
States  ; protracted negotiations at European Council 
level led to a compromise in December 2005, setting an 
expenditure ceiling of 1 p.c. of GNI in 2013 and   realigning 65
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the   allocation of funds more closely with the current 
spending structure.
Following difﬁ   cult negotiations with the European 
Parliament, a new Interinstitutional Agreement was 
signed on 17 May 2006, which meant a slight raising of 
this ceiling and built more ﬂ  exibility into the expenditure. 
It was also agreed to conduct a fundamental debate in 
2008-2009, primarily on the expenditure relating to the 
agricultural policy and the correction mechanisms for 
certain Member States, in order to prepare for a radical 
reform of the next Financial Perspective.66
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